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ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court significantly affected the dynamics of patent litigation, holding
that patent claim interpretation was not always reviewed de novo1 and that good faith
belief that a patent was invalid was not a defense to infringement.2 The Federal Circuit
potentially changed the approach to patent claim interpretation, holding that claims
could be interpreted in light of the written description of the invention, even where the
claim was not ambiguous. The Federal Circuit also addressed inducement of patent
infringement, holding that it was not inducement to suggest consulting a physician who
would likely prescribe an infringing treatment.3 The Federal Circuit also held that two
parties acting in concert could infringe a patent, replacing its rejected doctrine of divided
infringement.4 Trademark saw rejection of trade dress protection for cell phone design5
and conflicting opinions on whether disparaging trademarks are registrable.6 Copyright
cases show that fair use authorized the Google Book project7 and also protected against
attempts to use copyright to censor critics.8 Courts addressed some classics of copyright
courses, including the copyrightability of maps,9 recipes,10 and “Happy Birthday to
You.”11 Trade secret cases emphasized the fundamental requirements, rejecting attempts
to give trade secret protection where parties had failed to take the necessary reasonable
security measures.12

1

Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015).
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015).
Takeda Pharms. U.S.A., Inc. v. West-Ward Pharm. Corp., 785 F.3d 625(Fed. Cir. 2015).
4
Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
5
Apple v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 8096 (Fed. Cir. May 18, 2015).
6
Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse , 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89932 (E.D. Va. July 8, 2015); In re Tam
785 F.3d 567 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
7
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2015).
8
City of Inglewood v. Teixeira, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143380 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2015).
9
PhantomALERT, Inc. v. Google Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167754 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2015).
10
Tomaydo-Tomahhdo, LLC v. Vozary, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 18384 (6th Cir. 2015).
11
Marya v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129575 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2015).
12
See, e.g., Events Media Network, Inc. v. Weather Channel Interactive, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12497 (D.N.J. Feb. 3, 2015).
2
3
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I. PATENT
A. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.13

¶1

The key issue in many patent cases is interpretation of the relevant patent claim. A
broad or narrow reading of the claim may control whether the patent is valid and whether
there has been infringement. The Supreme Court, in Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz,
Inc, overruled long-standing Federal Circuit precedent and held that patent claim
interpretation is a legal question that may depend on subsidiary factual determinations, so
appellate review is a hybrid: de novo for the questions of law, clear error for the factual
determinations.14 The issue in the case was the meaning of the term “molecular weight”
as used in the claim allegedly infringed.15 The trial court interpreted the claim as referring
to molecular weight, finding one expert witness more convincing than another. The
appellate court reversed, holding the term to be indefinite.16 The Supreme Court reversed,

13

135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015).
Id. at 841 (“Accordingly, the question we have answered here concerns review of the district court’s
resolution of a subsidiary factual dispute that helps that court determine the proper interpretation of the
written patent claim. The district judge, after deciding the factual dispute, will then interpret the patent
claim in light of the facts as he has found them. This ultimate interpretation is a legal conclusion. The
appellate court can still review the district court’s ultimate construction of the claim de novo. But, to
overturn the judge’s resolution of an underlying factual dispute, the Court of Appeals must find that the
judge, in respect to those factual findings, has made a clear error.”).
15
Id. at 836.
16
Id.
14
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holding not that the appellate court had misinterpreted the claim, but rather that the
Federal Circuit practice gave too little deference to trial courts.
The district judge, after deciding the factual dispute, will then interpret the
patent claim in light of the facts as he has found them. This ultimate
interpretation is a legal conclusion. The appellate court can still review the
district court’s ultimate construction of the claim de novo. But, to overturn
the judge’s resolution of an underlying factual dispute, the Court of
Appeals must find that the judge, in respect to those factual findings, has
made a clear error.17
¶2

Teva may add reduce uncertainty to licensing practice, to the extent it makes
litigation more certain. When claim construction is reviewed completely de novo, then
the meaning of a patent claim remains unsettled until the appellate court has interpreted
the claim. To the extent claim interpretation rests on factual determinations, then the trial
court’s reading is more likely to be the final reading. Because every claim is different
(every patent must be different, because only new inventions are patentable), this increase
in certainty may facilitate licensing, at the margin.
B. Fenner Invs., Ltd. v. Cellco P’ship18

¶3

In Fenner, the Federal Circuit looked to the written description portion of the
patent in interpreting patent claims, even where there was no ambiguity in the claim itself
and there was no definition in the written description.19 The court held that reference to
the written description is proper to provide context to terms in claims, as opposed to
relying simply on their “literal” meaning.20 That approach is starkly at odds with the
traditional position of the Federal Circuit, under which unambiguous claims speak for
themselves, without need for interpretive guidance from the written description. If the
court continues to apply this approach, the impact on patent litigation and practice could
take different directions. It might clarify matters, on the grounds that patent claims will
be read more reliably, in a way that makes sense in terms of the entire patent. Or it might
introduce uncertainty, because apparently clear claims will become open to
reinterpretation based on argument drawn from anywhere in the entire patent. In addition,
the interplay with Teva could mean that apparently clear claims might be reinterpreted
based on factual determinations necessary to interpret other parts of the patent, which in
term give meaning to the patent claims. So Fenner may represent an attempt to make
patent claim interpretation more reliable, at the cost of introducing uncertainty into patent
practice, which in turn may complicate licensing of some patents and likewise complicate
patent disputes.

17

Id. at 841 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6)).
778 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
See, e.g., id. at 1323 (holding “[t]he foundation of judicial claim construction is the ‘written
description’ in the specification,” and interpreting claim in light of written description, including drawings).
20
Id.
18
19
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C. Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys.21
Takeda Pharm. U.S.A., Inc. v. West-Ward Pharm. Corp.22
¶4

¶5

A party seeking to license a patent may do so by enforcement, identifying potential
infringers and demanding a license. Potential infringers may include those actual
infringing and secondary infringers, such as someone inducing infringement of the
patent. Such secondary liability expands the scope of the patent’s power and the set of
potential licensees. Patent infringement may be strict liability, in a sense. Someone that
makes or uses the invention infringes, even if they do not know the invention is patented.
But inducement liability is not strict liability. The Supreme Court held that there is no
liability for inducement if the actor did not know of the relevant patent.23 In 2015,
Commil addressed the intermediate question: is there liability for inducement of
infringement, where the inducer knows of the patent but believes the patent is invalid?
The Court held that a good faith belief that a patent is invalid is not a defense to a claim
of inducement to infringe the patent.24
The boundaries of inducement were tested in Takeda, which held that a generic
pharmaceutical maker was not liable for inducement of infringement. Knowledge of the
relevant patent was not the issue, rather the question was the link between the defendant’s
behavior and subsequent infringement. Defendant’s advertising advised patients to
consult a physician if the patient experienced “gout flares.”25 The physician might then
prescribe an off-label use of the defendant’s pharmaceutical, which would infringe
method claims of the relevant patent. Such implicit encouragement fell short of
inducement: “Speculation or even proof that some, or even many, doctors would
prescribe Mitigare for acute flares is hardly evidence of inevitability. This evidence does
not show anything more than that there may be some infringing uses of Mitigare.” 26
D. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.27

¶6

Akamai also involves the practical question of, how large is the set of potential
patent infringers (and, indirectly, potential licensees). In 2014, the Supreme Court, in
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc.,28 rejected the theory of “divided
infringement,” under which there could be liability for inducement of patent infringement
by causing two people to take steps that, added together, would infringe a method patent,
even if neither performed all the steps that would infringe. The Supreme Court in
Akamai held there could be no secondary infringement by inducement, unless it resulted
in at least one direct infringer. But the Court left open the possibility that there could be

21

135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015).
785 F.3d 625 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011). See Stephen McJohn, Top Tens
in 2011: Patent and Trademark Cases, 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 313, 317 (2012).
24
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015).
25
Id. at 630.
26
Id. at 633.
27
797 F.3d 1020, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
28
134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014); see McJohn, Top Tens in 2014: Patent, Trademark, Copyright and Trade
Secret Cases, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP., 317, 325 (2015).
22
23
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infringement under such facts, if the parties were to be working together and so to jointly
infringe. On remand, the Federal Circuit followed that broad hint and abandoned its prior
requirement that joint infringement requires agency or contract, not simply two parties
working together. “We conclude, on the facts of this case, that liability under § 271(a)
can also be found when an alleged infringer conditions participation in an activity or
receipt of a benefit upon performance of a step or steps of a patented method and
establishes the manner or timing of that performance. . . . Alternatively, where two or
more actors form a joint enterprise, all can be charged with the acts of the other,
rendering each liable for the steps performed by the other as if each is a single actor.”29
Akamai affects both patent drafting and enforcement. Patent claims need not be drafted
so narrowly that they cover only the actions of a single person. Multiple people acting
together may infringe. By the same token, a license may be necessary to avoid
infringement, even for an actor performing only some of the steps of a patented method.
E. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t30

¶7

Kimble declined to overturn a much-criticized but easily avoided restriction on
patent licensing. In 1964, Brulotte v. Thys Co.31 held that a patent holder cannot charge

30

29
Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
135 S.Ct. 2401 (2015).

291

Vol. 14:3]

Stephen McJohn

royalties for the use of the invention after the patent expired. The rule has long been
criticized, on the theory that an agreement during the patent term for royalties payable
after the term does not leverage, the patent beyond its term, rather gets a promise payable
in the future. But the Kimble court in 2015 affirmed the 1964 holding of Brulotte that
license terms that go beyond the term of the relevant intellectual property may be
unenforceable, even without a showing that they have anti-competitive effect.32 Kimble
recognized the widespread criticism of Brulotte but held that considerations of stare
decisis were stronger. The rule was not shown to be so harmful that it was necessary to
overrule it. Congress had let the decision stand for decades. There was no actual evidence
(as opposed to economic theorizing) to show that it had a negative impact on innovation,
for parties could still do transactions with little obstruction:
Yet parties can often find ways around Brulotte, enabling them to achieve
those same ends. To start, Brulotte allows a licensee to defer payments for
pre-expiration use of a patent into the post-expiration period; all the
decision bars are royalties for using an invention after it has moved into
the public domain. A licensee could agree, for example, to pay the licensor
a sum equal to 10% of sales during the 20-year patent term, but to
amortize that amount over 40 years. That arrangement would at least bring
down early outlays, even if it would not do everything the parties might
want to allocate risk over a long timeframe. And parties have still more
options when a licensing agreement covers either multiple patents or
additional non-patent rights. Under Brulotte, royalties may run until the
latest-running patent covered in the parties' agreement expires. Too, postexpiration royalties are allowable so long as tied to a non-patent right—
even when closely related to a patent. That means, for example, that a
license involving both a patent and a trade secret can set a 5% royalty
during the patent period (as compensation for the two combined) and a 4%
royalty afterward (as payment for the trade secret alone). Finally and most
broadly, Brulotte poses no bar to business arrangements other than
royalties—all kinds of joint ventures, for example—that enable parties to
share the risks and rewards of commercializing an invention.33
¶8

The Brulotte rule still stands. But, important for practitioners, the Court made clear
that Brulotte is little more than a formality. As long as parties to a licensing transaction
are aware of the rule, they can structure their transaction to implement their deal, with
compliance with Brulotte presenting only drafting issues. So Brulotte is mainly a trap for
the unwary.

31
32
33
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Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015).
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F. Aria Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.34
In 2014, in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l,35 the Supreme Court set out a
stricter test for patentable subject matter. 36 The Alice court indicated that computerrelated claims would have to be closely tied to a specific application to be patentable:
“The method claims do not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the
computer itself. Nor do they effect an improvement in any other technology or technical
field.”37 In the wake of Alice, many computer-related patents have been held invalid as
claiming an unpatentable abstract idea, as opposed to a patentable application. Retaining
information in the navigation of online forms was held an abstract idea,38 as was using
software to make financial management decisions (such as budgeting).39 Such decisions
have broad potential effect in software licensing, making it much more difficult for the
holder of software patent with broad claims to be able to secure licenses from those
practicing technology that fall within those broad claims.
¶10
Sequenom shows how Alice goes beyond computer claims to areas such as biotech.
The effect with respect to some biotech patents may be quite different than in software.
The principal issue with software is often whether the patent broadly claims an abstract
idea, as opposed to narrowly claiming a specific application of an idea.40 That issue may
certainly arise in biotech, especially because in the age of genetics, much of biotech
depends on computing. But Sequenom shows the application of a different exception to
patentability (the nonpatentability of natural phenomena) which may bar patents even for
quite specific innovations. Sequenom’s patent covered a significant development in fetal
testing:
In 1996, Drs. Dennis Lo and James Wainscoat discovered cell-free fetal
DNA (“cffDNA”) in maternal plasma and serum, the portion of maternal
blood samples that other researchers had previously discarded as medical
waste. cffDNA is non-cellular fetal DNA that circulates freely in the blood
stream of a pregnant woman. Applying a combination of known
laboratory techniques to their discovery, Drs. Lo and Wainscoat
implemented a method for detecting the small fraction of paternally
inherited cffDNA in maternal plasma or serum to determine fetal
characteristics, such as gender. The invention, commercialized by
Sequenom as its MaterniT21 test, created an alternative for prenatal
diagnosis of fetal DNA that avoids the risks of widely-used techniques
that took samples from the fetus or placenta. In 2001, Drs. Lo and
Wainscoat obtained the ‘540 patent, which relates to this discovery.41

¶9

¶11

The Federal Circuit held the patent invalid, as preempting a natural phenomenon:
34

788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
See McJohn, Top Tens in 2014, supra note 29, at 321–23 (discussing Alice).
37
Id. at 323 (quoting Alice).
38
Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
39
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
40
See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008).
41
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
35
36
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The concern is that “patent law not inhibit further discovery by improperly
tying up the future use of these building blocks of human ingenuity.” In
other words, patent claims should not prevent the use of the basic building
blocks of technology—abstract ideas, naturally occurring phenomena, and
natural laws.42
¶12

If such patents are not valid, they will not be effective to prevent competitors or to
secure licensing revenue.
G. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC43

¶13

Citrix represents another limitation on software patents, and so a challenge to
software licensors, especially those that seek to enforce broad claims. Software patents
are often drafted in broad terms. After Alice, such claims may be challenged as abstract
ideas. In addition, even more specific software claims may be narrowed or invalidated as
being “means-plus-function” claims. The scope of such a patent may be considerably
narrowed (or invalidated for vagueness) if the claim is held to be a means-plus-function
claim, meaning that the written description of the claimed invention must contain a
specific description of the general “means” in claim.44
¶14
A long-standing issue is, which claims are deemed to be means-plus-function
claims. In Citrix, the Federal Circuit, ruling en banc, abandoned its prior practice that if a
claim did not actually use “means” there was a “strong presumption” that the claim was
not a means-plus-function claim.45 Applying that reasoning, the court held that “module”
could refer to a means, where that interpretation made sense in light of the entire patent.
Other cases in 2015 were consistent. The term “compliance mechanism” in a patent claim
was held to claim a means for compliance, meaning the patent was invalid for failing to
describe a structure that would provide that means.46 A patent asserted against
smartphone sellers was invalid for indefiniteness, where the specification did not disclose
algorithms or other structure to support the means claimed.47 Because computer
inventions in particular often involve functional claiming issues, means-plus function
determinations can determine the outcome of such litigation. 48

42

Id. at 1379 (relying on Alice).
792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
See Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV.
905 (2013).
45
Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
46
Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
47
EON Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 7464 (Fed. Cir. May
6, 2015).
48
See Lemley, supra note 46.
43
44
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H. In re Orbital Techs. Corp.49
Circuit Check, Inc. v. QXQ Inc.50
¶15

Orbital and Circuit Check simply represent the continuing challenge to patent law,
in the age of information and globalization, of appropriately identifying technology
which might precede an invention and so render it unpatentable. In Orbital, patent law
recognized the efficiencies afforded by software, while accepting the accompanying
limitations. A computerized translation of a patent, with considerable errors in grammar
and punctuation, was sufficient to serve as disabling prior art disclosure: “Without
blessing the use of machine translations in all cases, we find that the Machine Translation
used here provided adequate evidence of Tomofuji's contents because of the simplicity of
the technology and the teachings of Tomofuji's figures. It was therefore sufficient to
support the examiner's obviousness case.”51 But, in Circuit Check, rock carvings were an
insufficient basis to hold a circuit board testing device to be obvious.52 Although the
technology used in marking areas to be carved in rock carving may be similar, one
working on circuit board testing devices would not necessarily consult rock carving
techniques in addressing a problem of marking plates in manufacturing.
I. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC53

¶16

The issue of patent validity is key to the dynamics of patent licensing. If a patent
holder seeks licensing royalties, the other party may refuse on the grounds that the patent
is invalid. Whether to refuse depends, in part, on how costly and time-consuming it may
be to contest the validity of the patent. The America Invents Act in 2011 introduced postgrant procedures, new ways to challenge patent validity. Previously, if a party believed a
patent was invalid, the only ways to challenge it might be to raise invalidity as a defense
to an infringement suit or to bring a declaratory action. Either way required all the
expenses and delay of patent litigation in federal court. Post-grant procedures offer a
much simpler route, challenging the validity of the patent in a narrowly defined
procedure in the US Patent and Trademark Office, which by statute should take no more
than eighteen months. In Cuozzo, the Federal Circuit upheld key aspects of the post-grant
procedures, against challenges that the administrative procedure improperly failed to
mirror patent litigation in court: that a decision by the USPTO to grant a request to
institute a post-grant proceeding is not appealable; that the Patent Trials and Appeals
Board may apply the broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim, as opposed to the
narrower standard for claim interpretation applied by courts in litigation; and that
amendment of claims may be limited during PTAB proceedings. Hundreds of patent
challenges are making their way through the PTAB. Cuozzo signals the availability of
this new method for parties to challenge patent validity (and thereby avoid the need for a
patent license or, where no license is available, to cease their activity).

49

2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 970, *19 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 20, 2015).
795 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
In re Orbital Techs. Corp., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 970, *19 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 20, 2015).
52
Circuit Check, Inc. v. QXQ Inc., 795 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
53
793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
50
51
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J. VDF FutureCeuticals, Inc. v. Stiefel Labs., Inc.54
¶17

VDF FutureCeuticals illustrates how difficult it may be to draft a license that will
keep the other party to the perceived terms of the bargain. A licensor licensed the right to
make and sell “CoffeeBerry-based skin-care products,” in exchange for a percentage of
sales and of revenue from sublicensees. The license prohibited assignment, but did not
address changes of control. A sublicensee purchased all the stock of the licensee. This
gave the sublicensee control of the sublicensor (the licensee in the original license),
resulting in fewer royalties payable on the license. Because the parties achieved this by a
means permitted in the license (a change of control), it did not breach the license,
including royalty obligations.55
K. Lelo Inc. v. ITC56
ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. ITC57
Westerngeco L.L.C. v. Ion Geophysical Corp.58

¶18

The International Trade Commission enforcement procedures can be used to bar
importation of infringing products, offering an alternative to patent litigation. But
jurisdiction requires a showing of an effect on investment in the United States. Lelo held
that whether there is ITC jurisdiction to bar allegedly patent-infringing importation
depends on quantitative factors, such as a significant investment in plant or equipment in
the United States, not qualitative factors such as “crucial” component purchases from the
United States.59 ClearCorrect decided a question with broad implications: whether ITC
proceedings could be used to get injunctions against transmissions of data that could
facilitate patent infringement. The Federal Circuit held that jurisdiction to bar imports of
infringing “articles” does not apply to transmission of data, and so the ITC cannot be
used to police patent infringement by electronic transmission.60 Returning to patent
litigation in federal court, Westerngeco addressed another question with international
implications. The court held that a patent holder may recover for infringement by actions
in part outside the United States (such as where a supplier exported components intended
to be combined in an infringing manner) but the remedy is limited to reasonable royalties,
not a portion of the profits.61
L. Speedtrack, Inc. v. Office Depot, Inc.

¶19

Another case, not limited by a statutory reference to “articles,” reflects how
doctrine can adopt to trade in information. The Kessler doctrine bars an action against the
54
55

792 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2015).

VDF FutureCeuticals, Inc. v. Stiefel Labs., Inc., 792 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2015).
Lelo Inc. v. ITC, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 7708 (Fed. Cir. May 11, 2015).
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19558 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 10, 2015).
58
Westerngeco L.L.C. v. Ion Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
59
Lelo Inc. v. ITC, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 7708 (Fed. Cir. May 11, 2015).
60
ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. ITC, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19558 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 10, 2015).
61
Westerngeco L.L.C. v. Ion Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
56
57
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customers of a supplier of a product, where the supplier has been found not to infringe
the patent.62 Speedtrack applied the doctrine in the context of software services, even in
the absence of a tangible product.63
II. TRADEMARK
A. Sprinkler Warehouse, Inc. v. Systematic Rain, Inc.64
¶20

Domain names have figured prominently in trademark law developments, from
leading cases to a federal statute aimed squarely at bad faith registration of domain
names, the ACPA. But their legal nature remains to be fitted into existing categories.
There has been considerable theoretical speculation on whether a domain name might be
property, services provided under a contract, or a new hybrid legal concept. But there is
little concrete case law on the issue, what is a domain name, as a legal entity. Sprinkler
Warehouse held, following sparse authority, that a domain name is personal property,
subject to garnishment for the benefit of creditors.65
B. Apple v. Samsung Elecs. Co.66

¶21

A product’s design cannot be protected as a trademark if the design is functional.
The Supreme Court established as much in Traffix, holding that after the patent expired
on a popular design of temporary road signs, the ex-patentee Traffix could not prevent
others from using the design on the theory that the sign’s design was the trademark of
Traffix.67 The functionality doctrine has importance in an age where product
configuration has ever-greater market power. Apple v. Samsung held the product
configuration of the iPhone to be functional, and so not protected as trade dress, meaning
competitors that copied would not be liable for trademark infringement. Note that the
decision does not mean that product design cannot be protected as intellectual property.
Foresighted manufacturers can still use design patents to protect design, as Apple in fact
did.
C. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse68
In re Tam69

¶22

Intellectual property licensing is a key commercial activity that can have expressive
aspects, for the trademark owner and others. Several cases addressed the interplay
between the expressive effect of a mark, its effect on others, and whether the expression
62

Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U.S. 285 (1907).
791 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (applying Kessler doctrine).
859 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015) (“[W]e hold here that a domain name is a form of property
and we conclude that, despite the fact that a domain name may be categorized both as property and as a
contract for services, a domain name nevertheless qualifies as property subject to garnishment”).
65
Id. at 532.
66
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 8096 (Fed. Cir. May 18, 2015).
67
Traffix Devices v. Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23 (U.S. 2001).
68
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89932 (E.D. Va. July 8, 2015).
69
785 F.3d 567 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
63
64
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was protected by trademark law and the First Amendment. A federal district court held
that the “Washington Redskins” trademark for a professional football team was properly
cancelled by the US Patent & Trademark Office, on the grounds that the mark was
disparaging to Native Americans.70 The court rejected the First Amendment argument,
reasoning that registration of the mark was government speech, which the government
itself may govern. The court further reasoned that the party could still use the mark and
still protect it under common law rights. By contrast, In re Tam held that the First
Amendment barred enforcing the rule against registering disparaging marks, holding that
the USPTO could not refuse to register “The Slants” for an Asian-American dance rock
band.71
D. Virag, S.R.L. v. Sony Comput. Etm’t Am. LLC72

Screenshot from game in Virag73
¶23

Another conflict between trademark law and free expression may arise where an
author uses another person’s trademark in a creative work. For example, songs and song
titles often reference trademarks. Books—both fiction and non-fiction—mention
trademarks. It would be hard to write about marketing or culture without mentioning
trademarks. Recently, uses of marks in creative works, such as video games, have been
held not to infringe. The balance has weighed heavily in favor of free expression against
the slight risk of confusion as to sponsorship.

70

Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89932 (E.D. Va. July 8, 2015)
785 F.3d 567 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
No. 3:15-CV-01729-LB, 2015 WL 5000102, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015).
73
Jordan Greer, Sony Faces Down Gran Turismo Trademark Lawsuit in California Courts, GTPLANET
(Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.gtplanet.net/sony-faces-down-a-gran-turismo-trademark-lawsuit-incalifornia-courts/ [https://perma.cc/X9YQ-46N4].
71
72
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E. Multi Time Mach., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.74

Screenshot (post-case) of Amazon results for search of “MTM Special Ops”75
¶24

The “initial interest confusion” doctrine has been thought to prevent people from
free-riding on others’ trademarks by deceptively gaining consumers’ attention with use of
a mark, even where any confusion or deception was dispelled before the sale. The classic
example is putting Rolex prominently on the storefront of a store that sells no Rolexes.
Once inside, the potential buyers may be diverted to other brands that are available.
Initially, the initial interest doctrine was thought suitable for the Internet, with its constant
battle for eyeballs. But subsequent cases cast doubt on this theory. Most recently, the
Ninth Circuit held there was no trademark infringement where a search on Amazon for a
brand of watches (“MTM Special Ops”), which Amazon does not sell, returned results
featuring the products of competing watch sellers.76 The court rejected the application of
initial interest confusion.77
F. Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP78

¶25

Yet another angle on free expression is whether it protects the use of a trademark to
criticize the very holder of the mark. In Radiance Foundation, the Fourth Circuit held
74

804 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2015).
“MTM Special Ops,” AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_noss_2?url=searchalias%3Daps&field-keywords=MTM+Special+Ops [https://perma.cc/9KWQ-HWCZ] (last visited Feb. 1,
2016).
76
MultiTime Mach., Inc., 804 F.3d at 933.
77
Id. at 937–38.
78
786 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2015).
75
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there was no infringement in using the mark “NAACP” in an online article criticizing the
NAACP.79 Use in social criticism and commentary is not use in connection with the sale
of goods or services, as required for trademark infringement, the court held, even if the
site solicited donations.80 A web search for “NAACP” might lead to the page, but that
was not the consumer confusion that the Lanham Act guards against.81 Nor was there
“tarnishment,” a form of trademark dilution.82 The Lanham Act limits the dilution cause
of action with the defense of using the mark in “identifying and parodying, criticizing, or
commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark
owner.”83 In short, a trademark owner cannot limit criticism of it by preventing others
from directly referring to it. Similarly, use of a trademark in keyword advertising has
been held not to infringe, where there was a strong inference “that the purpose of
Defendants’ use of the marks [was] to disparage Plaintiff and endorse [Defendant],”
which would reduce any likelihood of confusion. 84
G. Nola Spice Designs, L.L.C. v. Haydel Enters.85

From Appendix to Nola Spice opinion

79

Id. at 320–21.
Id. at 326–27.
See id. at 325. The Fourth Circuit’s discussion is reminiscent of the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to apply
the initial interest confusion doctrine in Amazon. See MultiTime Mach., Inc., 804 F.3d at 937–38.
82
Radiance Found, Inc., 786 F.3d at 319.
83
Id. at 330 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii) (2015)).
84
Goldline, LLC v. Regal Assets, LLC, No. 14-03680, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52417, at *7 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 21, 2015).
85
783 F.3d 527 (5th Cir. 2015).
80
81
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Generic terms cannot serve as protectable as trademarks because they are merely
descriptive terms and are not distinctive. They do not distinguish a seller of the goods or
services from other sellers. Nola Spice shows how that doctrine can apply not just to
words but also to designs.86 In Nola Spice, the Fifth Circuit held that a stylized dog
figure made from traditional Mardi Gras beads was not a protectable trademark for its
seller because the symbol was merely descriptive of the Mardi Gras-themed products
(like the words "Mardi Gras Bead Dog," which the seller had no trademark rights in).87
H. In re Newbridge Cutlery Co.88

¶27

Newbridge Cutlery Co. highlights the growing importance of international
trademark protection. A primarily geographically descriptive mark, such as the name of
a town, is generally not registrable with the PTO because it is merely descriptive of the
goods and not distinctive.89 The PTO will register a primarily geographically descriptive
mark if it acquires distinctiveness (i.e., where consumers know the mark so well that it
has become associated with that particular seller).90 However, only geographic terms that
are primarily descriptive are unregistrable under the Lanham Act.91 “The rationale for
allowing registration of marks that relevant consumers do not view as primarily
geographic is that the consume would consider such marks ‘arbitrary.’”92 Whether a mark
is primarily geographically descriptive depends, in part, on how well known the name of
the place is to the public in the U.S., not its country of origin.93 Therefore, the Federal
Circuit held that the name of an obscure town, Newbridge, Ireland, was not the name of
“a place known generally to the relevant American public”—and thus, not
unregistrable—even if the place was well known abroad.94
I. B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus.95

¶28

In B&B Hardware, the Supreme Court addressed a procedural issue with
considerable practical impact: whether the normal rules of issue preclusion in federal
court litigation apply to a finding of likelihood of confusion by the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board (“TTAB”).96 The TTAB can determine whether two marks are
confusingly similar—and therefore, whether registration of one should be denied or

86

Id. at 542–43.
Id. at 538, 542–43.
776 F.3d 854 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
89
Id. at 859–60.
90
Id. at 859.
91
Id. at 860 (quoting Nantucket, 677 F.2d at 99 (“The word ‘primarily’ should not be overlooked, for it
is not the intent of the federal statute to refuse registration of a mark where the geographical meaning is
minor, obscure, remote, or unconnected with the goods.”)).
92
Id. (citing Nantucket, 677 F.2d at 100 n.8).
93
Id. at 862 (“That Newbridge is the second largest town in County Kildare and the seventeenth largest
in the Republic of Ireland reveals nothing about what the relevant American purchaser might perceive the
word “Newbridge” to mean and is too insignificant to show that Newbridge is a place known generally to
the American purchasing public.”).
94
Id.
95
135 S. Ct. at 1293 (2015).
96
Id. at 1299.
87
88
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cancelled—and it does so by applying the same thirteen DuPont factors that federal
courts apply.97 The TTAB is an administrative agency, and those procedures and burdens
before the TTAB are somewhat different than in federal courts. Before B&B Hardware,
it was unsettled whether the party that won before the TTAB could then use that finding
of likelihood of confusion to win a trademark infringement suit in federal court. In B&B
Hardware, the Supreme Court “h[e]ld that a court should give preclusive effect to TTAB
decisions if the ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met.”98 As with Cuozzo for
patents, the case gives weight to administrative proceedings involving intellectual
property, and so their importance in licensing practice.
J. Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank99
¶29

In Hana Fin., the Supreme Court held that the question of whether “tacking” is
available in determining trademark rights is a question for the jury to decide, not the
judge, “[b]ecause the tacking inquiry operates from the perspective of an ordinary
purchaser or consumer . . . .”100 A trademark owner may change or modify his mark over
time without losing the mark’s priority date, provided that the two versions of the mark,
“create the same, continuing commercial impression,” rendering them “legal
equivalents,” such that the modified mark is entitled to the priority date of the original
mark.101 Hana Fin. makes this issue a question of fact to be decided by the jury.102 Just
as the Teva decision put factual questions required for patent claim interpretation within
the province of the jury, so Hana Fin. may give juries a greater role in trademark cases.
K. Sandshaker Lounge & Package Store LLC v. Quietwater Entm’t Inc.103

¶30

Sandshaker Lounge highlights a key distinction between licensing of trademarks
and licensing of copyrights and patents. There are many steps a trademark owner must
take to ensure its mark remains protectable and enforceable. For example, the mark
owner must take all necessary steps to ensure its mark remains distinctive. Additionally,
some enforcement may be necessary to avoid abandonment. Enforcement was the issue
in Sandshaker Lounge. In Sandshaker Lounge, a bar claimed trademark rights in the
BUSHWACKER mark as applied to musical performances.104 However, the Eleventh
Circuit held that “whatever rights Quietwater might have had, its slumber on them rivaled
Rip van Winkel’s” because it waited nearly two decades until it finally objected to the
defendant’s use of the BUSHWACKER mark.105

97

Id. at 1301.
Id. at 1299.
135 S. Ct. 907 (2015).
100
Id. at 909.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
602 F. App’x 784 (11th Cir. 2015).
104
Id. at 788.
105
Id.
98
99
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III. COPYRIGHT
A. Garcia v. Google, Inc.106

A screenshot from the film at issue in Garcia
¶31

In 2014, a divided panel on the Ninth Circuit potentially upended copyright
licensing practice by reversing the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction and
holding that an actor, Garcia, “was likely to prevail on her copyright claim as to her
[brief] individual performance” in a film.107 Under that approach, even if the actor had
agreed that she had no authorship interest in the film’s copyright, her separate
performance copyright would have to be accounted for in licensing the film. Taken
broadly, anyone who added any creative expression to a work could have his or her own
separate copyright—the editor’s copyright in a paragraph of a novel or the lighting
director’s copyright in the display of a particular scene of a play. Those copyrights
would have effectively prevailed over agreements that the editor or lighting director
claimed no copyright in the novel or play. The Ninth Circuit sitting en banc, however,
overturned its prior holding Garcia on the grounds that an actor’s performance is not a
separate copyrightable work.108 Rather, a party that did not qualify as a joint author
could not circumvent that rule (or an agreement they had signed) by multiplying

106

786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
Garcia v. Google, Inc. 743 F.3d 1258, amended by Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 935 (9th
Cir. 2014).
108
Garcia, 786 F.3d at 740–41.
107
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copyrights.109 Not everything will qualify as a separate work of authorship. An actor’s
performance is not a copyrightable “work” of authorship.110
B. PhantomALERT, Inc. v. Google Inc.111

Screenshot taken of PhantomALERT’s site112
¶32

The first copyright statute of the United States covered only books, maps and
charts. The extent of copyright protection for maps has been litigated, albeit sporadically,
ever since. The case of maps is a classic teaching example for copyright classes. Facts are
not subject to copyright protection, because they do not originate with the author, even if
she discovers them.113 However, facts may be selected or arranged in a creative fashion to
warrant copyright protection.114 So a map, although it depicts facts, may have sufficient
creativity to be copyrighted.
¶33
PhantomALERT reinforces the freedom to copy facts that others make available,
unless someone has agreed to a license restricting copying. In PhantomALERT, the
Northern District of California dismissed PhantomALERT’s complaint alleging that
Google infringed its copyright by copying “Points of Interest” (such as police speedcheck radar locations) from PhantomALERT’s database of navigation information.115 In
PhantomALERT, the court stated that “[i]t [was] apparent from the allegation in the
Complaint that Plaintiff’s Points of Interest are inherently factual, involving ‘traffic

109

Id. at 742.
See id. The Second Circuit similarly held that the director of a film, who signed away his rights to
the film copyright, did not have a separate copyright in his contribution to the film or to the raw footage
that was not used in the film. See 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 257–58 (2d Cir. 2015).
111
No. 15-03986, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167754 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2015).
112
PHANTOMALERT, http://www.phantomalert.com/ [https://perma.cc/GM4N-ZH4G] (last visited
Apr. 18, 2016).
113
See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347–48 (1991).
114
See id. at 348.
115
PhantomALERT, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167754, at *2, 39.
110
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conditions, speed restrictions, and police-monitors,’ that is, objective facts that can be
discovered and reported.”116
C. Tomayo-Tomahhdo, LLC v. Vozary117
I.C. ex rel. Solovsky v. Delta Galil USA118
Bikram’s Yoga Coll. of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, LLC119
¶34

The Supreme Court has set a low bar for copyright protection, requiring only a
minimal spark of creativity.120 However, that minimal spark of creativity must be met.
For example, another old chestnut of copyright law is whether a recipe may be protected
by copyright. In Tomaydo-Tomahhdo, the Sixth Circuit held a recipe book insufficiently
creative to be protected by copyright.121

¶35

However, even an elementary schoolchild’s fingerpainting may be subject to
copyright protection, which illustrates just how low the bar for copyright protection is.122
In Solovsky, the court held that a second grader’s T-Shirt design (with the word “hi” on
the front with a smiley face and the word “bye” on the back with a frowny face)
sufficiently creative to survive the defendant’s motion to dismiss.123 Therefore, it was
potentially infringement for a company that sponsored the contest to use a similar design
without the child’s permission.124 In the age of Big Data, whether information is
protected by copyright may greatly influence licensing practices.

116

PhantomALERT, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167754, at *26.
No. 15-3179, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 18384 (6th Cir. Oct. 20, 2015).
No. 14-7289, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132052 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2015).
119
803 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2015).
120
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 361.
121
Tomaydo-Tomahhdo, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 18384, at *1; see generally Cathay Y. N. Smith, Food
Art: Protecting “Food Presentation” Under U.S. Intellectual Property Law, 14 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 1 (2014).
122
See Solovsky, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132052, at *29–34.
123
Id.
124
Id.
117
118
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The Supreme Court long ago established that a photograph may be the subject of
copyright protection.125 The Court has stated that there is ample creativity in the
arrangement and selection of material in the frame.126 However, in Rigsby v. Erie Ins.
Co., the Western District of Wisconsin dismissed plaintiffs’ copyright claim where
plaintiffs did not “identify any conscious choices they made regarding lighting or camera
angles for the purpose of being ‘original.’”127 Additionally, in Bikram's Yoga, the Ninth
Circuit held that copyright did not extend to a sequence of twenty-six yoga poses and two
breathing exercises, reasoning that the sequence was an unprotectable “idea, process, or
system designed to improve health,” as opposed to a “compilation” or “choreographic
work” like the choreography of a ballet.128
D. DC Comics v. Towle129

Batmobile130
¶37

Another classic question in copyright law is whether a character in a work can be
subject to copyright protection. DC Comics put a new spin on that issue, when the Ninth
Circuit held that a non-human character, a car known as the Batmobile, may be protected
by copyright.131 In reaching that conclusion, the court used similar reasoning as that for
human characters: (1) the character must generally have physical and conceptual
qualities; (2) the character must be "sufficiently delineated" to be recognizable in
repeated situations (i.e., the character must have “consistent, identifiable character traits
and attributes, although the character need not have a consistent appearance); and (3) the
character must be especially distinctive with unique elements, not just a stock
character.132 Having said that, a stock car might not be a stock character; witness the
leading characters in Pixar’s Cars. The case is perhaps most notable in continuing the
cheerful belief that legal formulations will provide predictable rules to categorize human
creations.
125

See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58–59 (1884).
See id.
No. 14-905, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31711, at *8 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 16, 2015).
128
Bikram's Yoga Coll. of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, LLC, 803 F.3d 1032, 1036–37 (9th Cir.
2015).
129
802 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2015).
130
Dominic Patten, “Holy Copyright Law, Batman!”: DC Comics Wins Batmobile Appeal, DEADLINE
HOLLYWOOD (Sept. 23, 2015, 9:14AM), http://deadline.com/2015/09/batmobile-dc-comics-batmancopyright-lawsuit-warner-bros-1201545884/ [https://perma.cc/4GD3-BKWX].
131
DC Comics, 802 F.3d at 1021–22.
132
Id. at 1021.
126
127
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E. Ford Motor Co. v. Autel US. Inc.133
¶38

Software, whether data or programs, is an increasingly vital component of many
products. Manufacturers may use technical measures to restrict user access to that
information. They may in turn claim that those technical measures are protected as antiaccess measures. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) prohibits
circumvention of technological measures that restrict access to copyrighted works. Some
courts, however, have read that prohibition narrowly. For example, in Ford Motor, the
Eastern District of Michigan held that Ford failed to plead its copyright infringement
claim and dismissed Ford’s complaint, which alleged that Autel violated the DMCA by
circumventing anti-access measures in order to access diagnostic data in the vehicles.134
The complaint alleged that Autel copied data but did not allege that Autel copied the
aspects of the data base that would be protected by copyright—Ford’s selection,
coordination, and arrangement of data.135 Autel circumvented anti-access measures, but
not to infringe copyright, so there was no violation of the anti-circumvention rules.136
Ford Motor’s reading of the DMCA appears to narrow its scope because the anticircumvention provisions would be violated only where a party was likely infringing
copyright anyway.137 But the contrary reading would give copyright-like protection well
beyond that afforded by copyright law.
¶39
When Congress passed the anti-circumvention rules, the statute provided a possible
balance to their broad scope by authorizing the Librarian of Congress to issue exemptions
to the anti-access rule, in order to protect such copyright values as fair use and the
noncopyrightability of facts and ideas. In practice, those exemptions have been very
limited. Perhaps cases like Ford Motor represent courts trying to step in to provide
balance.

133

No. 14-13760, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133201 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2015).
Id. at 13–20.
Id. at 12.
136
Id. at 13–20.
137
See id. at 13–20.
134
135
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F. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.138
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc.139
City of Inglewood v. Teixeira140

“Let’s Go Crazy #1”141
¶40

Another notable aspect of the DMCA gives immunity to internet service providers
for copyright infringement as long as they have a procedure in place to accommodate
take-down claims from copyright owners. Universal Music sent such a take-down notice
to YouTube when Lenz posted a video on the video-sharing site of her toddler dancing to
Prince’s “Let’s Go Crazy” playing in the background.142 In Lenz, the Ninth Circuit held
that the DMCA “requires copyright holders to consider fair use before sending a
takedown notification, and that failure to do so raises a triable issue as to whether the
138

801 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2015).
804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015).
No. 15-01815, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143380 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2015).
141
Stephanie Lenz, “Let’s Go Crazy” #1, YOUTUBE (Feb. 7, 2007),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N1KfJHFWlhQ [https://perma.cc/XXW9-R7E6].
142
See Lenz, 801 F.3d at 1129.
139
140
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copyright holder formed a subjective good faith belief that the use was not authorized by
law.”143 Many of the millions of take-down notices are generated by software. The
holding in Lenz means that copyright owners may need to adjust their software to avoid
possible liability.

¶41

Fair use can also affect such issues as whether a party may purchase a copyright in
order to suppress the content for political reasons.144 In City of Inglewood v. Teixeira, fair
use precluded the city from asserting its copyright interest in the video recordings of city
council meetings and from recovering from a critic who posted portions, with subtitles
and commentary.145

143

Id.

144

See generally Katz v. Google Inc., 802 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2015).
See City of Inglewood v. Teixeira, No. 15-01815, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143380, at *2 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 8, 2015).
145
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¶42

A blogger was protected by fair use in posting an “unflattering” photo of a business
person, where the subject had purchased the copyright in order to assert rights to have the
photo taken down.146

¶43

In Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., the Second Circuit held that fair use protected
copying by the Google Book project, which involved scanning libraries of books, putting
the files in a data base, and permitting online text searches that returned snippets of the
books.147
G. Marya v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc.148

A birthday scene from the film, “The Rejected”149

146
147
148
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See generally Katz, 802 F.3d 1178.
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 207 (2d Cir. 2015).
No. 13-4460, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129575 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2015).
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“Happy Birthday to You” is a staple of copyright lore. It illustrates how long
copyright protection lasts because the song was still subject to a registered copyright in
2015, despite being written in the 1920’s (and using music from before then).150 Further,
enforcement of the copyright illustrates the scope of the owner’s public performance
right. It may be copyright infringement for the staff at a restaurant to sing “Happy
Birthday to You” to a customer or for a scene in a movie to have a family sing the song at
dinner over a cake. To avoid licensing fees, restaurants may train their staff to sing other
songs and screenwriters may avoid birthday song scenes. The song now illustrates
possible murkiness of copyright ownership. For example, a court held that the
Warner/Chappell Music, which had collected millions in royalties for more than eight
decades for the “Happy Birthday to You” song, could not prove that it had copyright
ownership interest in the work.151
IV. TRADE SECRET
A. Infogroup, Inc. v. DatabaseLLC152

¶45

Information licensing intersects with several branches of intellectual property law.
Copyright does not protect a database, but a company can turn to trade secret law for
protection. But trade secret has its own requirements. Parties may try and claim valuable
information as a trade secret without having taken the steps necessary to secure trade
secret protection. In Infogroup, the court denied plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary
injunction holding that the corporation was not likely to succeed on its trade secret claim
because there was no evidence showing that its competitor had hacked or copied
information from plaintiff’s database that was not from the public sources.153 Database
owners may often license access to the information in the database. That may create
contractual obligations on the part of licensees, but does not, of itself, confer trade secret
status on the information. Trade secret law may not protect information in a database
consisting primarily of information available to the public from the state.154 Therefore,
the contractual protections may not give the information trade secret status, meaning that
parties not bound by the contract are free to acquire and use the information. A party
cannot simply proclaim information to be proprietary and thereby make it illegal for
others to use the information.

149
Ramin Tork, Randeh Shodeh (The rejected) an Iranian movie, Iranian.com (Jan. 13, 2009),
http://iranian.com/main/blog/ramintork/randeh-shodeh-rejected-iranian-movie.html
[https://perma.cc/N35C-D6QR]; see also David Wall, Minions Sing Happy Birthday, YOUTUBE (May 9,
2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xxOviBI-8fc [https://perma.cc/SSQ9-DZY6].
150
See, e.g., Marya, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129575.
151
Id. at *70–71.
152
95 F. Supp. 3d 1170 (D. Neb. 2015).
153
Id. at 1183.
154
See id.
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B. Spear Mktg., Inc. v. BancorpSouth Bank155
¶46

To have trade secret protection, a party must keep the information secret. In
licensing, this may create tension between exploiting and marketing the information,
which may require disclosing it, and securing trade secret protection, which requires
secrecy. In BancorpSouth Bank, the court found that there was insufficient evidence for
the jury to find that a party “used” plaintiff’s trade secrets in coding software where that
party had authorized access to view software demonstrations and later produced software
with similar functions.156 In addition, to the extent a trade secret claim rested simply on
unauthorized copying, the federal Copyright Act would preempt trade secret claims for
copying an uncopyrighted idea underlying software.
C. Big Vision Private, Ltd. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.157

Big Vision’s site158
¶47

License agreements require attention to such matters as who has rights under the
agreement. In trade secret, as with other types of intellectual property, a license can open
the door to wider exploitation than a party might expect. In Big Vision Private, the court
granted summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff’s unfair competition claim where
one division of the company shared information from a joint venture with another
division of the company, but there was no breach of contract or trade secret
misappropriation.159

155

95 F. Supp. 3d 1170 (D. Neb. 2015).
Id. at *46–47.
610 F. App’x 69 (2d Cir. 2015).
158
BIGVISION, http://www.bigvision4u.com/Index.html [https://perma.cc/982A-C359] (last visited
Apr. 22, 2016).
159
Big Vision Private, 610 Fed. Appx. at 71–72.
156
157
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D. Orthofix, Inc. v. Hunter160
¶48

Orthofix reinforces a basic point. Licenses, like other contracts, may create legal
protection of your information. Disclosure of “confidential” information does not violate
trade secret law if the information does not qualify as a trade secret (i.e., if there were not
sufficient security measures or if the information is not valuable in a trade secret sense).
But if the party has signed a non-disclosure agreement, the disclosure may constitute
breach of contract.161
E. Warehouse Solutions, Inc. v. Integrated Logistics, LLC162

¶49

A common theme in trade secret case law is locking the barn door after the horse
has been taken. There is no legal protection for valuable information if the owner has not
taken reasonable security measures to maintain secrecy. In Warehouse Solutions, the
court held that the features and functions of the software, which were discernible from
output available to clients without security restrictions, did not constitute trade secrets, as
opposed to the source code, which was not disclosed.163 In Warehouse Solutions, the
court acknowledged that the software distributed came from source code that was kept
confidential and so remained a trade secret.164 Courts also sometimes blur the line
between trade secret protection and misappropriation and are less likely to find that the
defendant has acted wrongfully if the plaintiff hasn’t taken adequate security measures.165

160

No. 15-3216, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 20111 (6th Cir. Nov. 17, 2015).
See, e.g., id. at *4.
610 F. App’x 881 (11th Cir. 2015).
163
Id. at 885.
164
Id.
165
See, e.g., Events Media Network, Inc. v. Weather Channel Interactive, Inc., No. 13-03, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12497, *26 (D.N.J. Feb. 3, 2015).
161
162
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F. NanoMech, Inc. v. Suresh166

¶50

A difficult case is where an employee may have taken trade secrets to a competitor.
The employer must identify the information, show that the legal requirements for trade
secret protection are met, and show that the information has been misappropriated. A
proxy for protecting trade secrets is a noncompete agreement, where an employee simply
promises not to work for competitors for a period of time. Because such agreements limit
a person’s very ability to work for a living, courts limit enforcement to reasonable terms
(if they enforce them at all). For example, a noncompete agreement with world-wide
scope and application to an entire industry is too broad to enforce.167
G. Events Media Network, Inc. v. Weather Channel Interactive, Inc.168

¶51

Mere pretense of security will not give trade secret protection. Where a party
licensed information, a database of media events, under terms that promoted public
availability, by encouraging disclosure of events to the public, the party could not
demonstrate the necessary reasonable security measures for trade secret protection.169 A
contract that imposes restrictions on disclosure, but also has provisions permitting
disclosure, will not create trade secret protection.170 Events Media illustrates a common

166

777 F.3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 2015) (“NanoMech argues that an unlimited geographic scope is
reasonable in this case because the company engages in global business and competes with nanotechnology
companies around the world. The Third Circuit in Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227 (3rd Cir. 2007),
observed that ‘[i]n this Information Age, a per se rule against broad geographic restrictions would seem
hopelessly antiquated,’ id. at 237, and NanoMech advances a similar theme here. But even assuming that
the Arkansas court would accept a worldwide geographic scope as reasonable in this context, . . . Suresh's
agreement is still overbroad because this agreement . . . prohibits her from working in any capacity for
any business that competes with the company. Under Arkansas law, a noncompete agreement must be
valid as written; a court may not narrow it. Bendinger v. Marshalltown Trowell Co., 994 S.W.2d 468, 473
(Ark. 1999). As we understand Arkansas law, a blanket prohibition on Suresh's ability to seek employment
of any kind with an employer in the nanotechnology industry anywhere in the world is unreasonable and
thus unenforceable.”).
167
See id.
168
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12497.
169
See id. at *26 (citations omitted) (“Finally, while the 2006 Agreement did contain a restriction on
TWC's right to use the Information, or portions of it, in programs other than event or attraction listings, it is
clear that this language also anticipates that such use could be permitted under the terms of the contract,
and the following sentence even concedes that ‘[t]o the extent any such use has been made of the
Information . . . [EMNI] consents to the continued use of such Information for such purpose.’ Such a
provision hardly indicates that Plaintiff was concerned that the Event and Attraction Data, or any portion
thereof, remain confidential indefinitely.”).
170
See id.
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set of facts. Only after a party realizes that it should have protected information against
disclosure does it seek to use litigation to achieve that goal, but its initial failure to put
reasonable security measures in place means that in litigation its trade secret claims will
not succeed.
H. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gum Tree Prop. Mgmt.171

¶52

Nationwide highlights an important practical issue that impacts the decision on
whether to license intellectual property. Liability insurance coverage may not cover
liability for intellectual property infringement. In Nationwide, the court held that an
insurance policy held for tort claims, such as advertising injuries, defamation and
invasion of privacy claims, did not extend to trade secret claims.172 This may affect
litigation strategy for both plaintiffs and defendants. It also makes one think whether
there is an overlooked market for offering intellectual property coverage insurance,
because that would seem to be, in the rare but worst case, a potentially large risk that
companies would be glad to pay a predictable premium to avoid. On the other hand, such
coverage may be difficult for insurance companies to quantify, given the very broad
spectrum of possible claims, and the fact that the insured would have considerable control
over whether its conduct was alleged to infringe.

171
172

597 F. App’x 241 (5th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 248.
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